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ABSTRACT
IMSI catching is a problem on all generations of mobile
telecommunication networks, i.e., 2G (GSM, GPRS), 3G
(HDSPA, EDGE, UMTS) and 4G (LTE, LTE+). Currently,
the SIM card of a mobile phone has to reveal its identity
over an insecure plaintext transmission, before encryption
is enabled. This identifier (the IMSI) can be intercepted
by adversaries that mount a passive or active attack. Such
identity exposure attacks are commonly referred to as ‘IMSI
catching’. Since the IMSI is uniquely identifying, unautho-
rized exposure can lead to various location privacy attacks.
We propose a solution, which essentially replaces the IM-
SIs with changing pseudonyms that are only identifiable by
the home network of the SIM’s own network provider. Con-
sequently, these pseudonyms are unlinkable by intermedi-
ate network providers and malicious adversaries, and there-
fore mitigate both passive and active attacks, which we also
formally verified using ProVerif. Our solution is compati-
ble with the current specifications of the mobile standards
and therefore requires no change in the infrastructure or
any of the already massively deployed network equipment.
The proposed method only requires limited changes to the
SIM and the authentication server, both of which are un-
der control of the user’s network provider. Therefore, any
individual (virtual) provider that distributes SIM cards and
controls its own authentication server can deploy a more pri-
vacy friendly mobile network that is resilient against IMSI
catching attacks.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Computer-communication networks]: General—
Security and protection; K.4.1 [Computers and society]:
Public Policy Issue—Privacy
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1. INTRODUCTION
In cellular technologies it is unavoidable that the mobile
telecommunication providers (which we will refer to as sim-
ply providers for the rest of this paper) need to know the
approximate location of their users1, in order to be able to
route incoming traffic to the mast currently nearest to the
user. This can lead to serious (location) privacy issues for
the users, as their approximate location is continuously mon-
itored. However, if we accept this issue, for instance because
we trust the providers, then there are still many other pri-
vacy issues related to mobile telephony, such as apps shar-
ing private data [2] or eavesdropping phone conversations
[3]. One of the first practical privacy attacks against mo-
bile phones was the so-called IMSI catching attack, and this
attack persists even in today’s mobile network standards.
This term refers to the unique identifier present in every
SIM2 card, called the IMSI for International Mobile Sub-
scriber Identifier. This identifier is transmitted in plain-text
over the wireless network as (initial) identification and can
therefore easily be intercepted.
IMSI Catching
IMSI catching was one of the first practical attacks on GSM,
leading to the development of devices called IMSI catchers,
which gather all IMSIs that are active in a geographic area.
An IMSI catcher can achieve this in two different ways: pas-
sive and active. The passive way is by simply observing
the wireless traffic and storing all IMSIs observed. For the
more effective active attack a fake base station is set up,
to which cell phones in the neighborhood will attempt to
connect. The fake base station then simply commands each
phone to identify itself. This way IMSIs can be retrieved
at any time, while with the passive attack the attacker has
to wait for phones to send out their IMSI. IMSI catchers
are commercially available, though they are expensive and
usually sold restrictively to government officials. However,
in recent years cheap and precise enough equipment has be-
come available that can be used to create an (active) IMSI
catcher. Likewise, cheap base stations called femtocells are
commercially available, several of which have been rooted,
1Actually, there have been proposals for a TOR-like net-
work among mobile phones, in order to obscure the location
of users for the network [1], but such a scheme seems imprac-
tical with regard to the reliability we have come to expect
from the mobile network.
2For sake of simplicity we use the term SIM to refer to both
the SIM (2G) and USIM (3G and 4G) applications and the
physical smart card containing them.
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making them into very cheap (below $100,-) IMSI catchers
[4].
Over time, the commercial IMSI catchers were extended
with a lot of additional functionality such as eavesdropping
on wireless calls. However, they are still, rather euphemisti-
cally, called IMSI catchers. This leads to a lot of confusion
on what is meant by an IMSI catching attack. For this ar-
ticle, we refer only to the gathering of IMSI numbers from
the air waves (either passive or active) as IMSI catching.
Recent news stories uncovered widespread use of unreg-
ulated IMSI catchers. In an article from The Washington
Post researchers found 18 IMSI catchers in Washington D.C.
within two days [5]. These IMSI catchers were present at air-
fields and embassies and could be detected since they actu-
ally ran active Man-in-the-Middle attacks, possibly to eaves-
drop on mobile connections. So, traditional IMSI catchers,
as discussed in this article, might be even more widespread.
The FCC started an internal task force to study the use of
IMSI catchers by criminals and foreign intelligence agencies
[6], indicating that these attacks are considered a serious
issue.
Location privacy
IMSI catching attacks mostly relate to the issue of loca-
tion privacy, as the transmission of your IMSI reveals your
approximate location. Location privacy attacks attempt to
link an identity to a location. By keeping one of these (iden-
tity or location) fixed and trying to recover the other, we
identify two different goals of location privacy attacks:
Retrieving identities at a location (monitoring)
A list of caught IMSIs can reveal who came at what
time within, for example, the near vicinity of a spe-
cific building, or was present at a certain rally. Such
monitoring is also used for commercial goals such as
customer monitoring. We have seen that shop keep-
ers already collect WiFi signals from phones to deter-
mine statistics such as returning customers or the ef-
fectiveness of their shop front [7]. IMSI catching could
be used not only to invade privacy but also for ac-
tual physical attacks. Consider, as (dramatic) exam-
ple, automated terrorist attacks that trigger bombs to
explode when high-value targets come in range of an
IMSI catcher [8, 9].
Retrieving a person’s location (tracking)
Recovering a person’s geographic movements can re-
veal a lot about what they do and who they meet.
As IMSI catching requires the operation of rogue cell
towers or passive listening antennas in the vicinity of
the victim(s), it seems most useful for monitoring at-
tacks. In GSM a cell tower can service an area up to
34 kilometers in diameter, so the vicinity is in the or-
der of several kilometers. For actual tracking over a
larger area, an attacker would need a mobile setup or
a network of antennas. This is not unthinkable, for
example the city of London initiated a project where
trash cans monitor WiFi signals of mobile phones to
profile people’s behavior in order to send them targeted
advertisements [10].
Traditionally, IMSI catching is associated with a more hy-
brid attack where police forces use IMSI catching to recover
information about the mobile subscription of a target [11].
They follow a target and gather a list of active IMSI num-
bers in several unrelated crowds on independent locations
and intersect the recovered sets of IMSI numbers. The le-
gitimacy of this method is debatable, especially since they
often transmit signals from fake cell-towers which interfere
with genuine cell-towers. Furthermore, this technique seems
to be used unregulated by several entities, such as intelli-
gence agencies and malicious adversaries [5, 12].
Contribution
This paper demonstrates that the weak protection against
unauthorized identification of SIM cards in mobile networks
is not a necessity, as is often claimed. Furthermore, we
propose a solution which defeats the IMSI catching attacks
and increases the credibility of the mutual authentication
with the home network. The latter has significant impact
against man-in-the-middle attacks such as presented in [13],
and provides additional security to 2G networks which cur-
rently only support a unilateral authentication procedure.
Our solution was formally verified using ProVerif and does
not interfere with the workings of the networks as they are
defined today, and is in fact backwards compatible with cur-
rent implementations. The only party that would need to
make a change would be the mobile providers, as they pro-
vision the user with an IMSI and the SIM that contains it
and are also the only party in control of the authentica-
tion server, where the IMSIs are linked to the authentica-
tion parameters (keys and algorithms). Every provider can
independently decide whether to implement this solution,
and as our solution changes nothing in the message defini-
tions a change happens transparently for any intermediate
providers.
Overview
We continue with some background information about mo-
bile networks in Section 2. This section not only discusses
identification in mobile networks, but also looks at authen-
tication, since our solution requires a change of a parameter
of one of the authentication messages. Section 3 describes
our solution against IMSI catching for the current technol-
ogy and provides the general idea of our solution. Section 4
describes our solution modified for the older, but still heav-
ily used 2G technology. We formally verify our solution in
Section 5, as well as analyze the effectiveness and conse-
quences of implementing it. Finally, we review related work
in Section 6 and draw conclusions in Section 7.
2. BACKGROUND
IMSI catching is an issue in what is often called the 3GPP
or GSM family of cellular technology; world-wide this is by-
far the most popular of the mobile telecommunication sys-
tems. This family of algorithms started in the early 90s
with the introduction of GSM, which was then 2nd gener-
ation mobile technology. Currently, we are seeing the de-
ployment of the 4G networks (LTE and LTE+). Within
each generation there have been incremental improvements
mostly to the up- and down-link speed (e.g. HSDPA+ over
UMTS in 3G), but the protocols themselves only receive real
changes with the move to a newer generation. As previously
stated, the IMSI catching problem exists in all generations.
This following sections give some background into specifics
of the 3GPP networks that are relevant for the IMSI catch-
ing dilemma. In Section 2.4 we describe 3G authentication
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in more detail, both as an example and because we use the
authentication messages in our solution.
2.1 Identification within 3GPP networks
Cell towers in mobile networks identify themselves by broad-
casting identifiers. Mobile phones pick up these signals and
decide whether to connect to a network or not. This de-
cision is based on data from the SIM, which instructs the
phone to look out for certain networks by both frequency
and identifier. When a mobile phone connects to a network,
it first requests a channel to exchange information on with
the cell tower. On this channel the cell tower can always
request the SIM’s identity. Identification is performed after
a simple command from the cell tower to a mobile phone.
This command, Identity request, specifies a specific identifier
(IMSI, TMSI, IMEI or IMEI(SV), see Section 2.2), to which
the phone responds with a so-called Identity response con-
taining the requested identifier [14, 15]. Authentication can
only take place after identification, because the authentica-
tion is based on a symmetric key shared between the SIM
and provider.
Interestingly, the specifications of the mobile standards
acknowledge the problems of IMSI catching. In [16] sev-
eral security goals for mobile networks are stated, among
which are confidentiality of the IMSI (user identity confi-
dentiality), user location confidentiality and user untrace-
ability (Section 5.1.1 of [16]). The same document acknowl-
edges the breach of user identity confidentiality introduced
with the request identification message (Section 6.2 of [16]),
though no breach of the location privacy issues is mentioned
here. The specifications further mandate that a SIM does
not answer Identity request messages asking for any identi-
fier, other then the IMSI, when no encryption context is yet
established (Section 4.4.4.2 of [15]). This, of course, would
not prevent IMSI catching, but does prevent the leaking of
the other identifiers to IMSI catchers. However, our experi-
ments show that all of the current 3G or 4G enabled phones
and SIM cards we tested also transmit the TMSI and IMEI
unprotected when requested.
2.2 3GPP identifiers
While this article is mostly concerned with protecting the
IMSI, many more identifiers exist in the 3GPP networks.
We discuss the most important of these briefly below.
International Mobile Subscriber Identifier (IMSI)
The IMSI is the main identifier in 3GPP networks and be-
longs to one specific SIM card. It is a 15 digit number where
the first three digits identify the home country (MCC, Mo-
bile Country Code), the following two or three digits iden-
tify the home network (MNC, Mobile Network Code). The
remaining nine or ten digits identify the specific user/SIM
within the provider’s database.
Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identifier (TMSI)
The TMSI is introduced to protect against traceability of
users. The TMSI is a temporary pseudonym provided to
the mobile device by the network, to use instead of the
IMSI, essentially masking the IMSI against passive attacks.
The TMSI is only valid within a certain geographical area.
When a mobile phone moves to another area it initiates a
location update procedure, which should provide it with a
new TMSI. The time a single TMSI remains valid is con-
figurable by the serving network. Since all communica-
tion with the mobile phone should be based on the TMSI3,
phones are traceable via the TMSI during a validity pe-
riod. TMSIs do not provide adequate protection against
IMSI catching attacks though, since a cell tower can al-
ways request a phone’s IMSI. TMSIs are therefore easily
defeated by active IMSI catching attacks. Furthermore,
research shows that in practice TMSIs remain valid for far
too long and are re-used over different areas [17], making
them even usable in passive IMSI catching attacks.
International Mobile Equipment Identifier (IMEI)
The IMEI is a 15 digit number that identifies the mobile
device itself. It is included to make black-listing of stolen
phones possible. There is a closely related alternative to
the IMEI, often referred to as IMEI(SV), which is one digit
longer and also identifies the software version running on
the phone.
Other identifiers
There are several other ways to identify a mobile device
based on its transmissions, for instance the phone’s answer
to authentication requests. Because these requests are an-
swered based on a shared secret key, the same challenge
always invokes the same response. There are also several
ways to identify a mobile device outside of the 3GPP pro-
tocols. Examples of these include the MAC address of the
WiFi or Bluetooth adapter.
2.3 Authentication within 3GPP networks
For all 3GPP systems the customer’s SIM card shares
a (set of) secret key(s) with the authentication server of
his provider. Any authentication and encryption of mes-
sages is performed with temporary keys derived from these
shared secret keys. The link between a SIM’s unique iden-
tifier (IMSI) and its secret keys is made either through a
diversified key solution or a simple look-up table. Once the
SIM has been identified, the network can look-up the ac-
companying secret key and initiate authentication.
It is important to note that the party authenticating the
mobile device does not need to be the user’s own provider.
A mobile device can be ‘roaming,’ i.e. using the network
of another provider. We call the network with which the
mobile device is currently connected the serving network,
and the network of the user’s provider the home network
(see Figure 1).
Figure 1: Schematic overview of the division between the
serving network and the home network.
The serving network starts a challenge-response protocol
with the SIM, which authenticates the SIM and establishes
(a) sessions key(s). When using 3G or 4G technologies, the
challenge sent by the serving network also authenticates the
home network, for 2G technologies there is only SIM-only
3Phones can also still be paged using their IMSI numbers,
and listening on paging channels shows that this occurs fre-
quently.
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authentication. Since only the authentication server within
the home network and the SIM know the secret key, the
serving network is not capable of authenticating (to) the
SIM. Obviously, it would be unacceptable for the different
providers to share the secret keys among each other. There-
fore, all 3GPP protocols have the serving network contact
the SIM’s home network to request authentication parame-
ters for the IMSI. This is possible because part of the IMSI
identifies the home network. The authentication parame-
ters contain a challenge, the associated response, resulting
session key(s) and, in case of 3G and 4G technology, an au-
thentication token. This authentication token is used for
the SIM to be able to authenticate the home network and
is essentially a sequence number shared between the SIM
and home network and a MAC over this sequence number
and the challenge. The serving network forwards the chal-
lenge and authentication token to the SIM, which verifies
the validity of the authentication token and responds to the
challenge. The SIM also uses the random challenge to com-
pute the session key(s) and forwards these to the phone.
The serving network compares the response from the SIM
with the response from the home network. If they are equal,
then the SIM is authenticated and both sides of the wireless
interface share a (set of) session key(s). In Section 2.4 the
authentication protocol for the 3G technology is discussed
in more detail.
This set-up leads to an interesting a-symmetry in the au-
thentication, whereby the serving network authenticates the
SIM and (in case of 3G and 4G) the SIM authenticates the
home network. It is also curious that for establishing the
session key(s), no input or freshness of the SIM is required.
2.4 3G Authentication and key establishment
Since our solution against IMSI catching requires a change
in the authentication procedure we will now take a detailed
look at authentication in 3G networks. This so-called Au-
thentication and Key Agreement (AKA) protocol provides
both mutual authentication, between SIM and home net-
work, and establishes session keys. The AKA protocol for
4G is almost identical, with only one additional parameter
used to diversify the session keys. A difference that has no
impact for this paper.4 This AKA protocol is defined in [16]
and we present an overview in Figure 2. The bit lengths of
important variables are summarized in Table 1.
To be more precise we first introduce the variables and
functions used in this paper to formalize the authentication
protocol. The set of all available IMSI numbers is denoted
by I and is available to the home network of the provider.
The home network stores the properties of a SIM card,
IMSI (i), secret key (K) and sequence number (SQN), as a
tuple s = 〈i,K, SQN〉 for each i ∈ I in the set of all available
SIM cards S. To simplify the notation, we use subscript on
a tuple to denote a single element from the corresponding
tuple, e.g. si denotes the IMSI number of the SIM card
s. Encryption with key k is denoted by Ek() and decryp-
tion by E−1k (). Consequently, generation of a MAC with
key k is denoted by Mk(). We do not specify a specific al-
gorithm, but several standardized cryptographic primitives
4In 4G AKA the serving network is not trusted to verify
the response to the challenge, as opposed to 2G and 3G.
However, this difference also has no influence on the rest of
the paper, as the serving network still requests the IMSI to
find the home network.
and methods are suitable for encryption [18, 19, 20] and
generating MACs [21, 22, 23]. The AKA protocol relies on
five encryption functions referred to as f1 to f5. The im-
plementation of these functions is provider-specific and not
fully standardized. However, the standard that defines the
security architecture [16] suggest that the provider may use
the example algorithm implementation set, defined in [24],
for authentication and key generation. This implementation
set is based on Rijndael, combined with different provider
codes that get XORed with the random challenge, for each
of the five algorithms. We assume in this paper that the
operator uses functions with similar characteristics as those
proposed in [24].
The SIM has at some point identified itself before the
authentication starts. The serving network can then re-
quest authentication parameters from the home network.
The home network computes the authentication parameters,
which consist of a freshly generated random which acts as
a challenge (RAND), the corresponding response (SRES),
confidentiality key (CK), integrity key (IK), anonymity key
(AK) and an authorization token (AUTN). The AUTN
token, is the authorization proof by the home network. It
consists of the sequence number XORed with the anonymity
key, the Authentication Management Field (AMF) and a
MAC over SQN, AMF and RAND. The sequence number
protects against re-play attacks, the AMF is for the provider
to use, for instance to signal a specific algorithm suite, or
set a time validity for a key and the MAC authenticates
this message as coming from the home network. The au-
thentication parameters are then transmitted to the serving
network. The challenge RAND and the AUTN token are
forwarded to the SIM.
The SIM, upon reception of an authentication request,
first retrieves the sequence number (XSQN), by computing
the anonymity key and XORing this with the sequence num-
ber from the AUTN token. Then the SIM verifies the MAC
over the authentication token. If the authentication token
proves genuine, the SIM verifies that the sequence number
from the network (XSQN) is higher than its own sequence
number (SQN). If the received sequence number is lower,
or too high, then the SIM responds with an error message
and a genuine network will then start a re-synchronization
setup. By how much the sequence numbers can deviate from
each other is a setting chosen by the home network.
If the sequence number falls within the range of allowed se-
quence numbers, the SIM computes the confidentiality key,
integrity key and response. The response is transmitted
back to the serving network and the two keys are stored
in the phone. The serving network compares the response
of the SIM (SRES) with the response of the home network
(XRES), and when found correct, the network can order
the use of integrity protection and ciphering.
The AKA protocol had been formally verified using en-
hanced BAN logic and shown to provide both authentica-
tion and confidentiality [26]. However, using ProVerif, a
location privacy attack was found by Arapinis et al. [27].
Replay attacks of the authentication token are prevented by
the sequence number, but replaying this token will break lo-
cation privacy, as the SIM responds differently to an out of
sync message than to an incorrect MAC message. Of course,
IMSI catching is an even simpler way of breaking location
privacy.
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SIM
IMSI,K, SQN
Serving network Home network
AMF ,
S = {s | ∀i ∈ I} where s = 〈i,K, SQN〉
identity request
identity response (IMSI)
IMSI
K, SQN ← s ∈ S where si = IMSI
RAND ← {0, 1}128
MAC ← f1(K, SQN,AMF,RAND)
XRES ← f2(K, RAND)
CK ← f3(K, RAND)
IK ← f4(K, RAND)
AK ← f5(K, RAND)
AUTN ← 〈SQN ⊕AK,AMF,MAC〉
update sSQN ← SQN + 1
RAND, AUTN , XRES, CK, IK
authentication request (RAND, AUTN)
AK ←f5(K, RAND)
XSQN ←AK ⊕AUTNSQN⊕AK
XMAC ←f1(K, XSQN,AUTNAMF , RAND)
verify XMAC = AUTNMAC
verify SQN ≤ XSQN ≤ (SQN + range)
update SQN ← XSQN + 1
SRES ← f2(K, RAND)
CK ← f3(K, RAND)
IK ← f4(K, RAND)
authentication response (SRES)
verify SRES = XRES
encrypted using CK
authenticity protected with IK
Figure 2: A schematic representation of successful SIM authentication in 3G networks [25]
Table 1: Bit length overview, starred lines are newly added
in the presented solution.
variable bit length
IMSI 60 (bcd encoded)
PMSI 34 ?
K 64 (2G) / 128 (3 and 4G)
RAND 128
SQN 62 ? (2G) / 48 (3 and 4G)
MAC 64 (3 and 4G)
Mκ 32 ? (2G)
3. SOLUTION FOR 3G/4G
The underlying weakness enabling IMSI catching attacks
is that the authentication is based on symmetric cryptog-
raphy. The use of a shared secret key, means a SIM has
to be identified before it can be authenticated. Identifica-
tion prior to (mutual) authentication is a problem that crops
up in other systems as well, such as in e-passports [28] and
RFID tags [29]. However, common solutions to this issue do
not help for the IMSI catching case. For instance random-
izing the IMSI is no solution, because the IMSI needs to be
identifying for the provider in order to provide cellular ser-
vice. Other solutions, such as encrypting the identifier with
the public key of the home network, would require changes
in the messages between the phone and network, as the re-
sulting ciphertext would not fit inside the currently defined
identity response messages. Furthermore, some additional
randomness would need to be added to every encryption to
ensure that the SIM does not simply use another long term
identifier (the encryption of the IMSI) instead of the IMSI.
The space for the IMSI in identity response messages leaves
too little room to add the randomness to the encryption
without changing the message size. Since it is unrealistic
to expect such changes to core message sizes being imple-
mented in the current mobile phone technology, we present
a solution that works within the current implementations.
We propose a solution where the IMSI is replaced with
a changing pseudonym that only the SIM’s home network
can link to the SIM’s identity. This hiding of the IMSI is
done without changing any of the system messages, thus
making it transparent to the serving network. This allows
our solution to be deployed by providers, on an individual
basis, on top of the currently available 3GPP networks.
During authentication, the authentication server supplies
the user’s SIM with a random new IMSI, which we refer
to as Pseudo Mobile Subscriber Identifier (PMSI). The SIM
uses the new PMSI the next time it is requested to reveal
its IMSI. As discussed in Section 2.4, the user’s provider op-
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SIM
PMSI, Pnew, κ,K, SQN
Serving network Home network
AMF ,
S = {s | ∀i ∈ I} where s = 〈i,K, SQN, κ, p, p′〉
identity request
update PMSI ← Pnew
identity response (PMSI)
PMSI
K, SQN, k, p, p′ ← s ∈ S where sp = PMSI ∨ sp′ = PMSI
if sp′ = PMSI then
update sp ← sp′
update sp′ ← {0, 1}34 /∈ {sp, sp′ |∀s ∈ S}
RAND ← Eκ(u = 〈p′, SQN〉)
MAC ← f1(K, SQN,AMF,RAND)
XRES ← f2(K, RAND)
CK ← f3(K, RAND)
IK ← f4(K, RAND)
AK ← f5(K, RAND)
AUTN ← 〈SQN ⊕AK,AMF,MAC〉
update sSQN ← SQN + 1
RAND, AUTN , XRES, CK, IK
authentication request (RAND, AUTN)
AK ←f5(K, RAND)
XSQN ←AK ⊕AUTNSQN⊕AK
XMAC ←f1(K, XSQN,AUTNAMF , RAND)
verify XMAC = AUTNMAC
verify SQN ≤ XSQN ≤ (SQN + range)
update SQN ← XSQN + 1
SRES ← f2(K, RAND)
CK ← f3(K, RAND)
IK ← f4(K, RAND)
u←E−1κ (RAND)
verify XSQN = uSQN
update Pnew ← up′
authentication response (SRES)
verify SRES = XRES
encrypted using CK
authenticity protected with IK
Figure 3: Solution proposed for 3G and 4G compatible authentication protocols. The black text shows our additions to the
standard protocols.
erates an authentication server which generates a random
challenge-response pair and the corresponding session keys.
We propose to use the random challenge (RAND) to pro-
vide the SIM with the PMSI. The PMSI has to be encrypted
in a semantically secure way, in order to keep it confiden-
tial between SIM and authentication server. The resulting
ciphertext should be sufficiently random and unpredictable
to still serve as the challenge.
The changes we make in the authentication protocol for
3G are illustrated in Figure 3, though these changes can
be applied the same way to the authentication in the other
generations of mobile networks. Comparing Figures 2 and
3 shows that no changes are made in the messages that are
transmitted, but only in the end points, i.e. the SIM and
home network. This makes our solution compatible with
all current implementations of the different generations of
mobile networks. The changes needed for the authentication
protocol used for 3G and 4G are discussed in detail in the
next section, the changes for the 2G authentication protocol
are discussed in Section 4.
3.1 Authentication server
In our solution, authentication servers have to be extended
to store three additional values for each SIM: the new shared
secret key κ and the two PMSI values p and p′. Here p is
used to store the PMSI value the SIM s is currently using
and p′ stores the new PMSI value that the authentication
server designates as the successor PMSI for that SIM. A
provider implementing this solution would change the nor-
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mal routine of its authentication server, when composing an
authentication request for PMSI as follows:
1. Validate if PMSI is known by the home network
∃s ∈ S, sp = PMSI ∨ sp′ = PMSI
2. Update the PMSI when the successor sp′ was used
if sp′ = PMSI then
sp ← sp′
sp′ ← {0, 1}34 /∈ {sp, sp′ |∀s ∈ S}
3. Compute challenge RAND by encrypting sp′ and SQN
RAND ← Eκ(u), where u = 〈sp′ , SQN〉
4. Compute other authentication parameters: MAC, XRES,
CK, IK, AK and AUTN
5. Increase sequence number SQN and update s ∈ S
sSQN ← SQN + 1
6. Transmit authentication parameters to serving network
Steps 1 and 2 are new for our solution, while the compu-
tation of RAND in step 3, was changed from generating a
random number in the standard procedure. The other steps
remain unchanged. The check in steps 1 and 2 has to be
done for each message parameterized with an PMSI arriv-
ing at the authentication server, such as the location update
message5, essentially using this as confirmation that the SIM
card is now using the pending PMSI sp′ as replacement for
the previous PMSI sp. Because of efficiency, serving net-
works often request multiple authentication parameters for
a SIM at the same time. So, to keep a check on the number
of pending PMSIs, the authentication server will keep send-
ing the same new PMSI number (with a different sequence
number) to the SIM, as long as a SIM identifies itself with
the same PMSI. This means the authentication server needs
to keep a running record of at most two PMSI-numbers per
SIM card.
3.2 SIM card
The SIM is extended to store the new shared secret key
κ next to two PMSIs; the currently active PMSI (PMSI)
and the future PMSI (Pnew). Upon receiving the challenge,
after normal verification steps (e.g. verifying the MAC and
the sequence number) a SIM can decrypt the challenge and
verify if the sequence number from the decrypted challenge
(uSQN ) is equal to the sequence number in the authentica-
tion token (SQN). If so, the SIM retrieves the new PMSI
(Pnew). Any future IMSI identification request can then be
answered with the newly received PMSI, instead of the pre-
vious PMSI by updating PMSI with Pnew. It is possible
for PMSI and Pnew to temporarily have the same value, if
PMSI is updated to its successor (Pnew) and no new PMSI
has yet been received.
Additionally, the SIM could have a policy which deter-
mines the amount of time it will wait for a new identity
request, so it can refresh its PMSI, before forcing a refresh
5Technically the location update is directed to a logically
separate entity: the Home Location Register. However in
practice this entity is always combined with the authentica-
tion server.
itself. Forcing a PMSI update is performed by, for instance,
signing on to the serving network as a freshly arrived SIM
with the new PMSI.
To support our solution a SIM card’s handling of authen-
tication requests should be changed to include steps 5 and
6 in the following procedure:
1. Perform existing authentication steps to recover XSQN
2. Use existing authentication procedure to verify MAC
3. Verify sequence number and update SQN
SQN ← XSQN + 1
4. Compute CK, IK and SRES
5. Decrypt RAND and verify sequence number uSQN
u←E−1κ (RAND)
verify XSQN = uSQN
6. Update the future PMSI Pnew to the supplied succes-
sor up′
Pnew ← up′
4. SOLUTION FOR 2G
In 2G authentication, the SIM authenticates itself to the
network, but the network does not authenticate itself to the
SIM. Figure 4 shows the 2G AKA protocol, with our changes
to hinder IMSI catching highlighted. These changes are pri-
marily meant to prevent IMSI catching attacks by supply-
ing the SIM with new PMSI numbers through the challenge,
same as before. However, as a side effect our solution gives
the SIM the capabilities to verify if a challenge presented to
him actually came from his home network.
Since standard 2G authentication has no sequence num-
ber, this has to be added for our solution. Compared to 3G
and 4G, the set of acceptable SQN values for the SIM has
to be much larger as there is no separate check on the SQN
before the PMSI is retrieved from the challenge. Further-
more, in 3G/4G their exist protocols to sync SQN when
the SIM and home network get out of sync. In the 2G en-
vironment we do not have the room to implement a sync-
ing protocol within the current specifications. An attacker
could therefore attempt to let the network issue many dif-
ferent challenges for the same SIM, thereby increasing its
SQN value, hoping to get the network out of sync with the
SIM. The SIM thus has to accept a much larger set of SQN
values, e.g. every uSQN value higher than its current value
for SQN , which still prevents replay attacks.
Since in 2G there is no guarantee that the challenge pre-
sented to the SIM is authentic, our solution requires an ad-
ditional integrity check on the encrypted PMSI. Otherwise,
an attacker could act as a base station and transmit a ran-
dom number as a challenge. In turn the SIM would decrypt
this, and if the SQN value is higher than the current value,
it would accept the first part of the decoded challenge as the
new PMSI and the SIM will start to identify itself with a
number unknown to the home network.
A cryptographic MAC (Mκ), computed by the home net-
work, counters a Denial-of-Service attack which aims to desyn-
chronize the SQN numbers known by the SIM and the home
network. Such an authenticity check makes it very difficult
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for an attacker to forge a valid authentication request with-
out knowledge of the secret key κ. This essentially intro-
duces an authentication of the home network to the SIM
card, which is not available in the default 2G authentication
protocol.
5. ANALYSIS
The previous sections presented our solution against IMSI
catching, in this section we analyze the effect of the proposed
solution. It provides new pseudonyms to the SIM to be used
instead of the IMSI. The pseudonyms are provided in a con-
fidential manner. An attacker, either active or passive, is
unable to learn said pseudonym before it is used, as long
as the attacker does not know the secret key κ. This pro-
vides unlinkability between consecutive pseudonyms. Fur-
thermore, this protocol changes nothing in the messages as
they are currently defined for 3GPP mobile telephony. The
change is transparent for the serving network and the chal-
lenge used to transmit the PMSI should still be random due
to the encryption and fresh due to the increasing sequence
number.
In the case of 2G there is an extra benefit to our ap-
proach, as it adds a message authentication to the challenge.
This does not prevent a Man-in-the-Middle attack, whereby
an attacker simply passes on the challenge (though with-
out learning the PMSI it contains), but it does prevent the
replaying of challenges or the insertion of false challenges.
Essentially achieving the same level of network authentica-
tion as in the standard 3G and 4G AKA algorithms.
The presented approach does not completely remove IMSI
catching as an attack. After all, a SIM receives a new PMSI
when authenticating, and will only start using it on the next
identity request message. So, after switching to a new PMSI,
a SIM will keep using that same PMSI for some time. Which
means traceability remains until the switch to a new PMSI is
made. In practice though, this remaining traceability mostly
coincides with the already existing traceability of the TMSI.
Our solution even alleviates the problems of TMSIs – too
long validity periods over multiple geographical areas – as
switching PMSIs, will automatically refresh the TMSI, since
the SIM will then appear as a new SIM to the serving net-
work.
The country and home network code of the IMSI will need
to remain intact for our PMSI numbers, because these are
needed to route messages to the user’s home network. This
means, that even using our PMSI pseudonyms, there are
still some privacy issues, since a SIM will still reveal its
home country and home network, when transmitting their
PMSI. In essence the use of a PMSI provides k-anonymity
to users [30], where k is the size of the group of expected
users in this geographic area who have the same home coun-
try and home network. In most countries there are only
a small number of mobile providers operational, they will
mostly have fairly large consumer bases and thus a large k
can be expected [31]. In other words, this solution provides
stronger anonymity to users from a provider with a large
consumer base, within their home country. If those users
use their phone abroad, their traceability will likely increase
dramatically, as there will be few other users transmitting
an IMSI starting with the same country code.
The sequence number is added to the encryption for three
reasons: (I) it provides semantically secure encryption, which
is important because the same PMSI can be encrypted into
several challenges, (II) it prevents replay attacks, and (III)
it provides a way for the SIM to check the integrity of the
decrypted data (in 3G and 4G), effectively preventing fake
challenge attacks.
The use of the sequence number SQN suggests the pos-
sibility of the SIM and authentication server getting out-of-
sync. However, in the 3G and 4G case the sequence number
is already verified before the decryption of the challenge.
Furthermore, there is a protocol already in place to re-sync
the sequence number. In the 2G case the sequence number is
only needed to prevent replay attacks, so the set of accept-
able sequence numbers can be big enough to assure that
the home network’s SQN does not get out-of-sync with the
SIM’s. An attacker could attempt to start many fake sign-
on sessions with a victim’s current PMSI in a different cell,
to force the home networks SQN out-of-sync with the SIM.
However, this can be detected by the home network (many
incoming requests for authentication parameters without a
location update following it), so this can be counteracted
by delaying the handing out of authentication parameters,
when such an attack is detected.
In the original protocol for 2G networks no sequence num-
bers are used during authentication. Even worse, there is
no mutual authentication in 2G networks, which means an
active attacker can simply insert authentication challenges
for the phone. Our approach has the added benefit of pre-
venting such attacks, as both replay attacks on challenges
or insertion of fake challenges can be detected (due to the
sequence number and MAC).
As it is not possible for an attacker to create a correct
PMSI update without the secret key κ, and the sequence
numbers cannot be forced out-of-sync, there is no increased
risk for a Denial-of-Service attack. A DoS attack could still
be used to prevent the SIM from getting new PMSIs. How-
ever, this is essentially the same as simply preventing all
service to the user, and as soon as the SIM connects to a
genuine network, this protocol provides it with a new PMSI.
When the secret key κ is compromised, an adversary is
able to track users in the future. Moreover, our method does
not provide perfect forward secrecy [32] and lacks protection
against analysis of historical recordings of previous PMSI
updates if the secret key κ is known. However, recovery of
key κ requires considerable computational power, which can
most-likely better be utilized to attack other cryptographic
primitives used in 2G and 3G protocols.
Even with our solution in place, users might still have to
take additional measures to make tracking harder, e.g. by
disabling their WiFi and Bluetooth services, as these are
also uniquely identifying.
Finally, our approach only protects from IMSI catching
and not eavesdropping or Man-in-the-Middle attacks, which
are also often referred to as IMSI catching. A powerful ad-
versary might be able to forward and relay messages between
the victim’s phone and the genuine home network, while
mounting various well-known cryptographic attacks on 2G
networks [3, 33, 34, 35, 36]. In such scenario, we consider
the security to be compromised since all 2G communication
traffic can be observed, and location privacy attacks can be
re-introduced through identification based on the contents
of data transmissions. However, our solution hinders these
attacks and others, such as sending malicious messages over
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SIM
PMSI, Pnew, SQN, κ,K
Serving network Home network
S = {s | ∀i ∈ I} where s = 〈i,K, SQN, κ, p, p′〉
identity request
update PMSI ← Pnew
identity response (PMSI)
PMSI
K, SQN, k, p, p′ ← s ∈ S where sp = PMSI ∨ sp′ = PMSI
if sp′ = PMSI then
update sp ← sp′
update sp′ ← {0, 1}34 /∈ {sp, sp′ |∀s ∈ S}
m←Mκ(p′, SQN)
RAND ← Eκ(u = 〈p′, SQN,m〉)
XRES ← A3(K, RAND)
CK ← A8(K, RAND)
update sSQN ← SQN + 1
RAND, XRES, CK
authentication request (RAND)
u← E−1κ (RAND)
m←Mκ(up′ , uSQN )
verify m = um
verify SQN ≤ uSQN
update SQN ← uSQN + 1
update Pnew ← up′
SRES ← A3(K, RAND)
CK ← A8(K, RAND)
authentication response (SRES)
verify SRES = XRES
encrypted using CK
Figure 4: Solution proposed for 2G compatible authentication protocols. The black text shows our additions to the standard
protocols.
the air, as these can no longer rely on the IMSI to identify
their target.
5.1 Parameter choice
As was explained in Section 2.2 the IMSI is a 15 digit num-
ber, containing a three digit country code and a maximum
of three digits for the home network code. This means there
can be at most 1010 different IMSIs per provider. There-
fore, we need at most 34 bits for the PMSI in a challenge.
Phones send the IMSI in BCD encoding (4 bits per digit),
but there is no reason to encode a PMSI encrypted inside
the RAND in such an inefficient way. As the challenge is 16
bytes for all generations of mobile networks, this leaves us 94
bits to use for the counter SQN , which is 48 bit, in the case
of 3G/4G. In the case of 2G, the remaining 94 bits would
need to accommodate both the counter SQN and the MAC
(Mκ). This means the 2G case can accommodate a SQN of
62 bits while allowing a Mκ of 32 bits. Table 1 provides a
short overview of the bit lengths of different variables.
We introduced a new shared key for the encryption of the
PMSIs: κ. While the existing shared key K could be reused
for κ, we do not recommend this. It is good security design
to use different keys for different functions. In fact, while we
use κ for both encryption and MAC generation in the 2G
solution, it is again good design to use two separate keys for
this. The eventual choice for κ is naturally dependent on
the choice of encryption and MAC scheme and as such it is
not included in Table 1.
Since asking the authentication server for multiple chal-
lenges for an IMSI will give several encryptions of the same
PMSI, with only an increased counter, the cipher used for en-
cryption should be secure against related plaintext attacks.
For the 3G and 4G networks, the AES blockcipher is ad-
vised for the implementation of the authentication functions
[24]. AES is secure under related plaintext attacks, so sim-
ply reusing AES here would be enough. For 2G networks,
the authentication functions are called A3/A8 and can be
chosen by the provider. The suggested algorithm, called
COMP128, is secret and proprietary. At least the first ver-
sion is known to be weak [37]. Also in the 2G case, the
choice for a the MAC algorithm (Mκ) is not trivial, with
a 32 bit output and a 96 bit input. One option would be
to reuse 2G’s authentication algorithm A3, which takes a
128 bit challenge and computes a 32 bit response, as Mκ.
So, a provider would have to see whether their implemen-
tation for A3/A8 would be secure for both the encryption
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of the PMSIs (so, related plaintexts) and the MAC gener-
ation. Then again, our fix demands an update of the SIM
cards anyway, so updating the 2G authentication algorithms
could be added at minimal cost.
5.2 Roll-out scenario & overhead
We discussed our solution with a major telecom provider,
both in terms of feasibility and possible roll-out scenarios.
They considered our solution as a possible fix to prevent
(long term) tracking of customers.
Swapping all SIMs is a costly operation for a provider.
The SIMs themselves are quite cheap, but the process of
handing them out is costly. However, many SIM cards cur-
rently out in the field can be updated remotely through
Over-The-Air (OTA) commands. Not all SIMs in the field
that support such updates, accept updates to the authen-
tication procedure, but we could not obtain the numbers
of updateable SIMs. Still, since the presented solution is
backwards compatible – a non-updated SIM will simply an-
swer the challenge as it always did, without ever switching
to the new PMSI – there are no big issues in rolling out our
improvement to only a set of SIMs.
The overhead introduced by the additional computations
in our solutions is expected to be very small for both the
home network and SIM. We introduce one MAC generation
and verification (only for 2G) and a symmetric encryption
and decryption operation. Even for SIM cards with limited
computational power this should not present a problem, as
this is functionality that is already used in the original pro-
tocols.
Our solution introduces a small overhead for the serving
network, because a SIM that switches to a new PMSI will
look like a completely new phone to the serving network.
Naturally, the SIM cannot sign off with the old PMSI first, as
this would defeat the purpose of unlinkability. Networks are
used to phones that do not sign off properly, and occasion-
ally check whether phones registered in their area are still
present. Wide adoption of our solution is likely to increase
these numbers. The exact influence of this overhead is hard
to estimate without field trials, though serving networks are
already resilient against high number of fast moving SIMs,
making it unlikely that our change would significantly im-
pact their workings.
5.3 Formal verification
To verify our solution formally we make use of ProVerif,
an automatic cryptographic protocol verifier [38]. This tool
is used to check for secrecy and authentication properties
of security protocols, but can also be used to check privacy
related properties [39]. The usual Dolev-Yao attacker model
is assumed, where the attacker has complete control over the
network but cannot break cryptography [40]. The analysis
by ProVerif is sound but not complete, i.e. ProVerif returns
no false positives (claiming that a property holds, though
an attack still exists), but it might find invalid attacks. We
modeled the original protocols and our proposed modified
versions for both 2G and 3G/4G in the typed applied pi-
calculus.6 For these models we check whether an attacker
can link different sessions of the AKA protocol that belong
to the same user. This is done by starting two sessions by
different users. After this, a third sessions is started and the
6The models are available at http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/
˜deruitej/
attacker has to distinguish which of the two users started it.
For the original protocols for 2G and 3G/4G, no unlinkabil-
ity is provided and a valid attack is returned by ProVerif.
Unlinkability is however proved by ProVerif for our solu-
tions for these mobile technology generations. In addition
to unlinkability, we also check authentication between the
SIM and home network for 2G. As expected this fails for the
original protocol, but holds when our solution is used. These
proofs give confidence that our solutions for both the 2G and
3G/4G protocols actually introduce protection against IMSI
catching – an attacker is no longer able to determine which
sessions belong to which users – while keeping the original
functionality of the protocols (authentication) intact.
6. RELATED WORK
We present a solution against probably the oldest practical
attack against 3GPP networks: IMSI catching. We know of
no other work describing a solution against IMSI catching,
though there is a lot of work regarding privacy issues in
mobile telephony in general.
Dabrowski et al. [41] listed several indicators for the pos-
sible presence of IMSI catchers. They also created both a
network of stationary measurement devices and an Android
app, each capable of detecting IMSI catchers. Karsten Nohl
and others similarly introduced an Android app capable of
detecting IMSI catchers [42]. This app warns the user for
the likely presence of IMSI catchers, where the term IMSI
catchers refers to the more inclusive meaning of the word
and also includes eavesdropping. Warning users of these at-
tacks is very valuable and provides a basis for our claims
that these attacks are prevalent, but it does not prevent
such attacks as our solution does.
While not addressing IMSI catching, there has been re-
search into other location privacy issues caused by the 3GPP
protocols. Arapinis et al. [27] used ProVerif to formally ver-
ify the 3G specifications. This revealed two new privacy
issues; linkability of the IMSI to the TMSI using paging of
mobile phones and a traceability attack that was detailed
in Section 2.4. They also present solutions for both attacks;
encrypting the IMSI in a paging command with a shared ses-
sion key, and encrypting the response of a failed authentica-
tion request with a public key of the provider. Interestingly,
our solution would diminish the effects of the IMSI - TMSI
linkability, as a PMSI refresh will appear to the serving net-
work as a new SIM arriving, which causes the assigning of
a new TMSI. Our presented solution therefore negates the
need for encrypting the IMSI. The solution for the trace-
ability attack is still required whether or not our solution is
implemented.
Hahn et al. [43] suggest a different solution for the Arapinis
traceability attack. The response of a failed authentication
request is essentially encrypted with the new symmetric ses-
sion key instead of the public key solution offered by Arap-
inis et al. This solution might be more efficient, though the
consequences of switching to the session key provided by a
re-played challenge are not deeply explored.
In other work Arapinis et al. looked specifically at the TMSI
reallocation protocol [17], both formally and experimentally.
Both the specifications and common implementations were
found to be having problems leading to privacy attacks.
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These privacy attacks stem from possible linkability between
different TMSIs or recovering the link between an IMSI and
a TMSI. These attacks mostly have even simpler counter
measures than our solution against IMSI catching. How-
ever, again the implementation of our solution would also
prevent these TMSI attacks. If the SIM changes its IMSI
(PMSI), the TMSI will get changed as well.
7. CONCLUSION
We present the first solution against IMSI catching attacks
that fits within the current standards, making the change
transparent for intermediate networks and backwards com-
patible. We propose the introduction of changing pseudonyms
(PMSIs), to use for identification. This solution can be
deployed within the current architecture by an individual
provider, as it controls the only two entities that need adapt-
ing: the SIM cards providing the IMSI and the authentica-
tion server within the home network. Additionally, this so-
lution provides the SIM with a way to verify whether a given
challenge was generated by its home network, adding a form
of mutual authentication to the traditionally weak SIM-only
authentication of 2G networks. Using the protocol verifier
ProVerif, we verified that our solution indeed provides un-
linkability between succeeding pseudonyms without harming
the original verification.
In essence we bring the effectiveness of IMSI catching down
to the effectiveness of TMSI catching: learning a tempo-
rary id, which is unlinkable to future temporary ids. This
prevents long term tracking of individuals, as well as trac-
ing individuals returning to specific locations. Essentially,
our proposal provides k-anonymity for users [30], where k is
the expected number of users from a specific home network
provider and country in a specific location.
Our solution need not interfere with lawful interception uses
of IMSI catching, as authorities can still go to a provider
with a caught PMSI together with the time of the catching.
Based on this information the provider should be able to re-
trieve the corresponding account from its logs. Our solution,
however, does interfere with unlawful IMSI catching.
For future cellular communication standards (5G and on)
the issue of IMSI catching could be easily tackled using a-
symmetric cryptography, which we could not use because
the increase in resulting ciphertext sizes would not fit inside
the current message specifications. However, it is still un-
clear whether the newer standards will introduce such a fix
and even if they do, eventual roll-out is still far away. Even
worse, the current roll-out of second, third and fourth gen-
eration cellular communication will not simply be replaced,
and will likely remain functional for the foreseeable future.
The solution presented in this paper could remedy the issue
of IMSI catching in the current systems. Hopefully, our fix
will contribute to finally solve the privacy and traceability
attacks present in over 25 years of 3GPP protocols.
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